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The Communication Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case 
for Renewing the Presumption Against Preemption 
Ryan J.P. Dyer* 
“The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a  
lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Few things in history have expanded the reach of human enterprise 
like the Internet. Since its inception, the Internet has disseminated the 
most vital commodity known to man—information. But not all infor-
mation is societally desirable. In fact, much of what the Internet serves to 
disseminate is demonstrably criminal. Nevertheless, in the effort to un-
bind the “vibrant and competitive free market” of ideas on the Internet, 
Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA).
2
 In essence, section 230 of the CDA grants immunity to “interac-
tive computer service providers”3 (ICSPs) from liability for information 
provided by a third party.
4
 Courts have broadly applied section 230’s 
grant of immunity to bar plaintiffs seeking to hold ICSPs liable for third-
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 1. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 2008) (writing for the majority, Chief Judge Kozinski noted that “[t]he Internet is no longer 
a fragile new means of communications that could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous 
enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has be-
come a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which commerce is conducted. And its 
vast reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of 
immunity provided by Congress and . . . comply with laws of general applicability.” Id. at n.15). 
 2. The Communications Decency Act, Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offen-
sive Material, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998) [hereinafter section 230] (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 3. For all intents and purposes—“websites.” 
 4. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996). 
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party content posted to their websites.
5
 However, as the Internet perme-
ates deeper into modern society, an increasing amount of criminal activi-
ty is finding refuge behind outdated and obtuse constructions of section 
230’s immunity provisions.6 Consequently, state and local governments 
are faced with a diminishing capacity to properly confront the widening 
array of criminal activity perpetrated via the Internet.
7
 
Section 230 has garnered significant attention since its enactment, 
and many commentators have noted the sweeping impunity it has be-
stowed upon websites that host third-party content.
8
 The initial scope of 
immunity provided by courts applying section 230, as well as the practi-
cal consequences of its continued construction, is well documented.
9
 This 
Comment strives to explain why courts applying section 230 today—
over fifteen years after its enactment and in the face of flagrantly crimi-
nal complicity on the part of websites—continue to accept the preemp-
tive scope established by early courts. More specifically, this Comment 
suggests that, in certain contexts, courts applying section 230 immunity 
should reexamine the preemptive effect Congress intended section 230 to 
have on traditional state police powers.
10
 Doing so would not only reveal 
the unwarranted scope of activities currently deemed immune under sec-
tion 230, but would also redeem the ability of state and local authorities 
to combat the increasing amount of criminal activity on the Internet.
11
 
Part II of this Comment outlines the legislative history and intent of 
section 230, as well as the evolution of judicial construction and applica-
tion of the statute’s immunity-granting provision. Part III discusses how 
early courts’ over-expansive interpretation of section 230, coupled with 
the current proliferation of cybercrime, is increasingly paralyzing states’ 
efforts to combat crime perpetrated via the Internet. Part IV identifies the 
locus of continued misconstruction by courts applying section 230 as the 
failure to reevaluate Congress’s preemptive intent in light of the chang-
ing dynamic on the Internet. Part V analyzes the several judicial and leg-
islative solutions that could alleviate the strain that section 230 immunity 
                                                         
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. See infra Part III.A. 
 7. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 8. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 373, 410–12 (2010). 
 9. See infra Part II–III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part IV. See generally INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATIONS, 2012 INTERNET CRIME REPORT (2013), available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/ann 
ualreport/2012 _IC3Report.pdf. 
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puts on state and local efforts to deal with criminal activity perpetrated 
via the Internet. Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion. 
II.  THE CONCEPTION & APPLICATION OF SECTION 230 
Section 230’s inclusion as part of the CDA represented Congress’s 
desire to remove the disincentives for online intermediaries to police ac-
tivity on their websites. The new provision arrived with a splash as early 
courts gave section 230’s scope of immunity expansive effect.12 Origi-
nally, the provision was intended to encourage the removal of offensive 
content; instead, it has developed into a broad grant of immunity for 
websites that host offensive and criminal content. 
A.  A Brief History 
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 was enacted at the 
height of a national struggle between explosive growth in the telecom-
munications industry
13
 and resurgent social conservatism.
14
 Senator 
James Exon from Nebraska spearheaded the legislation, intending to 
combat the danger posed to the youth of America
15
 by “barbarian por-
nographers.”16 Several CDA provisions were widely scrutinized for their 
questionable constitutionality.
17
 Eventually, in Reno v. ACLU, the Su-
preme Court struck down portions of the Act that criminalized the trans-
mission of indecent material accessible to minors.
18
 Yet most of the Act 
still remained intact, including section 230. 
Section 230, titled “Protection for Private Blocking and Screening 
of Offensive Material,” was created “to promote the continued develop-
ment of the Internet.”19 At the time of the CDA’s creation, Congress 
                                                         
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. WALTER SAPRONOV & WILLIAM H. READ, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: LAW, REGULATION, 
AND POLICY xi (1998). 
 14. For additional background on the social conservative movement in the mid-1990s, see 
DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE 
POLITICAL HISTORY (2007). 
 15. For an extensive discussion regarding the legislative history of the CDA, see Robert Can-
non, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbari-
ans on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996). 
 16. 141 CONG. REC. S8339 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Senator Exon) (quoting 
Brock N. Meeks). 
 17. See Cannon, supra note 15, at 65–72 (discussing the popular opposition to introduction of 
the CDA amongst member of the Senate and House of Representatives). 
 18. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (invalidating provisions of section 223(a) and (d) 
except as applied to child pornography). 
 19. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (1996). 
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doubted certain CDA provisions would survive constitutional scrutiny
20
 
and thus enacted section 230 as a “complementary backstop” to the Act’s 
more dubious provisions.
21
 Congress was also motivated to override a 
recent decision of a New York trial court in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services.22 
In Stratton Oakmont, an ICSP was held liable for a third party’s li-
belous statements posted on its computer bulletin boards.
23
 The ICSP 
exercised some editorial control over the content posted on its interactive 
user bulletin boards and touted itself as a family-oriented computer net-
work.
24
 The court held that because the ICSP had exercised some editori-
al control over its bulletin boards, it could be held liable under a publish-
er theory of liability just like a brick-and-mortar newspaper or maga-
zine.
25
 
Concerned that the decision in Stratton Oakmont would serve as a 
disincentive for ICSPs to exercise any editorial control over third-party 
content posted to their sites lest they incur full publisher liability, Con-
gress responded by including section 230 in the CDA.
26
 Specifically, 
Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden proposed an amend-
ment to the draft CDA (the Cox–Wyden Proposal).27 The Cox–Wyden 
Proposal sought to address the dilemma Stratton Oakmont created by 
removing traditional forms of publisher liability for ICSPs who acted in 
good faith to restrict access to offensive content.
28
 However, unlike the 
provisions Senator Exon advocated,
29
 the Cox–Wyden Proposal did not 
affirmatively require ICSPs to make good faith efforts to qualify for im-
                                                         
 20. See 141 CONG. REC. S8331 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 21. See David Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The 
Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 375 (2010). 
 22. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *3–4 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995). 
 23. Id. at *17–18. 
 24. Id. at *2. 
 25. Id. at *10–11. 
 26. The congressional approval of such action can be seen in 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); see al-
so H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10 (“One of the specific 
purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions 
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own 
because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”). 
 27. 141 CONG. REC. 22044–45 (amendment offered by Rep. Cox). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See sources cited supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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munity.
30
 Nevertheless, both the Exon and Cox–Wyden Proposals were 
enacted as part of the CDA. 
The immunity-granting provision of section 230 provides as fol-
lows: 
(c) Protection for “good samaritan” blocking and screening of of-
fensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.
31
 
Section 230 expansively defines an “interactive computer service” to 
include all online service providers and websites;
32
 an “information con-
tent provider” is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer service.”33 Congress attempted 
to limit the scope of immunity by stating that section 230 would have no 
effect on federal criminal statutes, intellectual property law, communica-
tions privacy law, or “any State law that is consistent with this section.”34 
However, subsection (c) has unintentionally become the most impactful 
language within the entire CDA, controlling virtually every cause of ac-
tion against ICSPs.
35
 
B.  Judicial Treatment 
Generally, courts broadly interpret section 230 and the immunity it 
provides ICSPs. As discussed below, early courts benefited from factual 
                                                         
 30. Id. In this way, the Cox–Wyden Proposal differed from the provisions Senator Exon advo-
cated, which required good faith efforts in to qualify for immunity and were subsequently struck 
down by the court in Reno v. ACLU. 47 U.S.C. § 223(f)(1) (1996). 
 31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996). 
 32. Specifically, an “interactive computer service” is “any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such sys-
tems operated or services offered by libraries or educations institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) 
(1996). Courts have construed interactive computer service broadly to include websites. Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1996). 
 34. Id. § 230(e)(3). 
 35. For an extensive compilation of cases and their outcomes involving the widespread usage 
of section 230, see Ken S. Myers, Wikimunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipe-
dia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163 (2006); see also Claudia G Catalano, Annotation, Validity, Con-
struction, and Applications of Immunity Provisions of Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 
230, 52 A.L.R. FED.2d 37 (2011). 
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circumstances mirroring the context in which section 230(c) was meant 
to apply. However, the first courts to interpret and apply section 230 
went “further than was necessary to effectuate the congressional goals” 
of the statute’s immunity-granting provision.36 Although unapparent at 
first, this over-expansive reading of section 230(c) laid the groundwork 
for broad applications of immunity by future courts in contexts blatantly 
incommensurate with the statutes intended scope and effect. 
The first major case interpreting section 230 was the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.37 Plaintiff Zeran was the 
subject of a hoax in which an unidentified person advertised t-shirts dis-
playing offensive slogans related to the recent Oklahoma City bomb-
ing.
38
 The posted advertisement appeared on America Online’s (AOL) 
public message boards and listed Zeran’s phone number, urging viewers 
to contact Zeran for more information.
39
 Zeran was quickly inundated 
with threatening phone calls from viewers of the ad, and the next day he 
called AOL to complain.
40
 AOL agreed to remove the ad but did not is-
sue a retraction, and shortly after, similar ads continued to appear.
41
 Ze-
ran filed suit claiming that once AOL received notice of the fallacious 
postings, it had a duty to remove the postings, issue a retraction, and pre-
vent a reoccurrence.
42
 
In an attempt to give far-reaching effect to Congress’s intent to 
overrule Stratton Oakmont, the Fourth Circuit broadly interpreted section 
230’s scope of immunity afforded ICSPs.43 Specifically, the court inter-
preted the section 230(c) safe harbor provisions to confer immunity to 
ICSPs for a broad range of claims including “tort-based lawsuits” and 
“tort liability.”44 The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation represented a far-
reaching application of section 230(c), which previously had been 
thought to target mainly defamation-based claims.
45
 Furthermore, the 
                                                         
 36. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 385. 
 37. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 38. Id. at 329. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 330. 
 43. Id. at 328. 
 44. Id. at 330. 
 45. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 395–99 (2010). Lukmire contends: 
Properly read, Zeran, at its most expansive, ought to have stood for the proposition that 
section 230 conferred immunity on Internet entities only insofar as third-party content 
caused ‘defamation-type’ harms. The court’s reliance on doctrine exclusive to defamation 
law to establish that ‘distributor liability is a subset of publisher liability’ contradicts the 
notion that sections 230’s safe harbor extends to any legal malfeasance perpetrated by  
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court repeatedly stated that free speech concerns had been a major factor 
motivating Congress to enact the section 230(c) safe harbor provi-
sions
46—a proposition not necessarily supported by the provision’s text 
or history.
47
 Nevertheless, Zeran established the precedent for broad 
grants of immunity under section 230(c), a standard currently followed 
by a majority of both federal and state courts.
48
 
For more than a decade, the broad immunity afforded by the hold-
ing in Zeran stood as an insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs seeking to 
impose liability on ICSPs. For example, in Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth 
Circuit faced the issue of whether an operator of an Internet site main-
taining an electronic newsletter was liable for selecting and publishing an 
allegedly defamatory e-mail.
49
 The court instructed that “the exclusion of 
‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usu-
al prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material and to 
edit the material published while retaining its basic form and message.”50 
While a publisher could encounter liability for substantial alterations, the 
Batzel court’s holding turned on the fact that the operator made no mate-
rial contribution to the e-mail at issue during the editing process and 
therefore was not responsible for the e-mail’s defamatory content.51 
Similarly, in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., a Texas district court declined 
to hold MySpace liable for failing to implement safety measures to pro-
tect minors from online sexual predators.
52
 The plaintiff attempted to rely 
on state common law tort principles and alleged liability on the theory 
that because MySpace “knew sexual predators were using the service to 
communicate with minors . . . it was foreseeable that minors such as Julie 
                                                                                                                              
a third party. 
Id. at 395–96 (citations omitted). 
 46. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31, 333–35. 
 47. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 385, 389. 
 48. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 (Cal. 2006) (describing Zeran as the 
leading case interpreting section 230 immunity); see also id. at 518 n.9 (listing state and federal 
cases following Zeran’s interpretation of section 230 immunity). Specifically, courts have relied on 
Zeran to establish three elements required for section  230 immunity: “(1) the defendant must be a 
provider or user of an ‘interactive computer service’; (2) the asserted claims must treat the defendant 
as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the challenged communication must be ‘infor-
mation provided by another information content provider.’” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 
(9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
 49. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tex. 2007). The plaintiff, a      
thirteen-year-old girl, had misrepresented her age when creating an online profile on MySpace’s 
social networking site and was subsequently contacted by an adult man who allegedly perpetrated a 
sexual assault on her. Id. at 846. 
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Doe could be injured by the criminal acts of adult MySpace users.”53 The 
court disagreed and, relying heavily on Zeran, held that MySpace was 
merely an intermediary “provid[ing] its services to users for free” and 
thus fell squarely within the safe harbor provisions of section 230(c).
54
 
In contrast, the first case seriously limiting the application of sec-
tion 230 immunity was the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC 
(Roommates).55 The Housing Council sued Roommates.com for match-
ing individuals based on their answers to mandatory online questions 
concerning criteria banned by the federal Fair Housing Act
56
 and Cali-
fornia housing discrimination laws.
57
 Despite Roommates.com’s undis-
puted status as an “interactive service provider” within the meaning of 
section 230, the plaintiff alleged the site was more than a mere publisher 
of information provided by its users.
58
 Instead, Roommates.com was act-
ing as an “information content provider” because the site created, posted, 
required completion of, and disseminated the results of unlawful ques-
tionnaires.
59
 In a divided opinion,
60
 the court agreed that Room-
mates.com’s activities were sufficient to make it “‘responsible . . . in part’ 
for creating or developing” content, and thus, Roommates.com failed to 
fulfill the third element of section 230(c) and was not entitled to immuni-
ty.
61
 
The Roommates decision received mixed reviews from legal schol-
ars and Internet-industry observers.
62
 Many commentators felt that the 
Roommates court had created a “slippery slope” by assigning such an 
extensive definition to the term “development.”63  Others regarded the 
move as a necessary limitation to the provisions of section 230, which 
                                                         
 53. Id. at 851. 
 54. Id. at 850. 
 55. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 56. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 
(2012). 
 57. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162. 
 58. Id. at 1164–65. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The court split 8–3 with Chief Judge Kozinski writing for the majority and Judge McKe-
own concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 1160, 1176. 
 61. Id. at 1165–69. The third element requires that the challenged communication must be 
“information provided by another information content provider” and not by the ICSP itself. Id. at 
1162 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1996)). 
 62. See Eric Weslander, Murky “Development”: How the Ninth Circuit Exposed Ambiguity 
Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 267, 290–94 (2008). 
 63. Id. at 293–95. 
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had fostered an unchecked environment of “internet exceptionalism.”64 
What was clear was that the holding in Roommates opened the door to 
new theories of exclusions to section 230 immunity.
65
 
A particular piece of language from the Roommates decision pro-
vided the basis for arguably the narrowest application of section 230’s 
safe harbor provisions. In defining the term “develop,” the Roommates 
court noted that “a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus 
falls within the exceptions to section 230, if it contributes materially to 
the alleged illegality of the conduct.” 66  A discrepancy immediately 
emerged regarding the application of the “underlying illegality” test: is 
express “solicitation” on the part of the ICSP required, or is mere “in-
ducement” sufficient to trigger liability?67 To date, most cases have re-
quired that the defendant explicitly solicit illegal content.
68
 However, in 
NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc. (StubHub),69 a Massachusetts trial court ex-
pansively applied Roommates’s articulation of develop and denied im-
munity to an ICSP for merely inducing the creation of illegal content.
70
 
The inducement standard articulated in StubHub apparently does not re-
quire an actual request and can occur even when third parties retain un-
fettered discretion over the content.
71
 Although the exact contours of the 
theory are unclear, liability under an inducement standard is based on an 
indistinct determination that the defendant’s actions influenced a third 
party’s decision to post illegal content.72 
                                                         
 64. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 398–99; but see Varty Defterderian, Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 564 (2009). 
 65. See Weslander, supra note 62, at 293–97; Jeffrey R. Doty, Inducement or Solicitation? 
Competing Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the Wake of Roommates.com, 6 
WASH J. L. TECH. & ARTS 125, 129–32 (2010). 
 66. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d  at 1168 (emphasis added). 
 67. For an extensive discussion of the “underlying illegality” test, see Doty, supra note 65, at 
126; see also Zac Locke, Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites That Distribute 
Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151 (2008). 
 68. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); Best 
Western Int’l, Inc. v. Furber, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 4182827 (D. Ariz. 2008); 
Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
 69. NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26,  
2009). In NPS v. StubHub, the New England Patriots brought suit against StubHub alleging tortious 
interference by allowing season ticket holders to unlawfully sell their tickets. Id. at *4. StubHub 
operated a website that allowed users to buy and sell tickets to sporting, concert, theater, and other 
live entertainment events. Id. at *2. StubHub did not buy or sell the tickets directly but it did profit 
from the transactions and facilitated these ticket sales in a number of ways. StubHub even allowed 
sellers to “mask” the ticket location by listing a seat up to five rows away, making it impossible for 
the Patriots to determine which ticket holders were selling their tickets. Id. at *3. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at *12–13. 
 72. Id. 
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The first courts to apply section 230 inferred an exaggerated statu-
tory meaning and intent to the statute’s immunity-granting provision, 
rarely reexamining the basis of those findings. Several early courts have 
crafted various frameworks to exempt section 230 immunity; however, 
they have done so through a more limited analytical framework, focusing 
on section 230’s mechanics and definitions.73 Courts have yet to delve 
deeper into an analysis of the preemptive intent Congress envisioned for 
section 230. This is especially troubling given the increasing frequency 
that section 230 immunity is invoked in non-defamation contexts and the 
preemptive effect that necessarily follows other state civil and criminal 
laws. 
III. SECTION 230’S INCREASING IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The ever-increasing migration of human activity to computer tech-
nology, specifically the Internet, has encapsulated nearly every aspect of 
society. Unsurprisingly, this shift includes an increasing amount of crim-
inal activity, which has been transformed into a new and more diffuse 
form—cybercrime.74 Traditional modes of law enforcement are not well 
adapted to combat cybercrime because it differs from traditional crime in 
several fundamental ways. Nevertheless, section 230’s over-application 
into non-publisher forms of liability—such as distributor liability—has 
quickly invaded numerous forms of state civil and criminal liability that 
would normally serve as effective tools for combating cybercrime. The 
effect is an utter preemption of state laws as applied to ICSPs engaged in 
criminal activity, rendering states helpless to enforce their historic police 
powers to combat the proliferation of cybercrime. 
A. The Proliferation of Cybercrime 
Cybercrime essentially encompasses three distinct categories. In the 
first category, the actual computer and associated information technology 
is the target of the offense; the perpetrator often employs hacking, virus 
dissemination, or the interruption of computer services.
75
 The second 
category entails a traditional crime where the computer and Internet 
                                                         
 73. See generally Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); StubHub, 2009 WL 995483; Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Record-
ings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012). 
 74. “Cybercrime” essentially denotes the use of computer technology to achieve an unlawful 
purpose. See generally Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As “Virtual Crime”?, 4 CAL. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 75. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH.  465, 468–69 (1997). 
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merely play an incidental role; for example, a ransom note sent by kid-
nappers via e-mail.
76
 The third and final category also consists of tradi-
tional crimes, but the computer and Internet play an instrumental role in 
carrying out the offense.
77
 Common examples of this category include 
identity theft, fraud, fencing stolen property, and commercial sex adver-
tising.
78
 Traditional modes of law enforcement cannot effectively combat 
most forms of cybercrime because of the inherent differences between 
cybercrime and the traditional crimes law enforcement have evolved to 
combat.
79
 Specifically, cybercrime differs from traditional crime because 
it is physically diffuse and frequently occurs on a much broader scale.
80
 
Given the inherent challenges of combatting cybercrime, it is simp-
ly unfeasible for law enforcement to address every instance.
81
 One viable 
alternative is for law enforcement to focus on the various technological 
intermediaries necessary to conduct Internet activity in general.
82
 Such 
intermediaries generally fall into three categories.
83
 
The first category includes intermediaries that provide the network 
and infrastructure to facilitate the physical transportation of data across 
the Internet.
84
 Intermediaries in this category typically operate solely as 
passive conduits transmitting the data between users and other interme-
diaries.
85
 Common examples of this first category include cable Internet 
providers, satellite providers, or wireless carriers.
86
 
                                                         
 76. See generally id. 
 77. See generally Brenner, supra note 74. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Susan Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of Law En-
forcement?, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 25 (2004). Professor Brenner identifies four 
primary components of cybercrime that differ inherently from most traditional criminal activity. 
First, cybercrime does not require “any degree of physical proximity between victim and victimizer 
at the moment the ‘crime’ is committed.” Id. at 25 (footnote omitted). Second, cybercrime is not 
confined to a definite scale because the internet “acts as a force multiplier that vastly increases the 
number of ‘crimes’ an individual can commit.” Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). Third, “perpetrators of 
cybercrime are not restricted by the [physical] constraints that” otherwise govern perpetrators of 
traditional crimes. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted). Finally, the novel nature of cybercrime means that 
law enforcement “cannot identify patterns comparable to those that exist for real-world crime.” Id. at 
33 (footnote omitted). 
 80. For an extended discussion of the distinctions between cybercrime and traditional crime, 
see Brenner, supra note 74, at 25–40. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cyber-
crime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1585 (2005). 
 83. See Ardia, supra note 8, at 386. 
 84. See Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 664 (2003). 
 85. See Ardia, supra note 8, at 386–87. 
 86. See generally Zittrain, supra note 84. 
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The second category of intermediary is comprised of content hosts 
that store, cache, or otherwise provide users with access to third party 
generated content.
87
 Essentially, these conduit intermediaries either host 
the servers that store online content created by third parties or create the 
websites that allow users to access content, often assuming both func-
tions.
88
 Common examples include websites such as Yahoo, Facebook, 
and GoDaddy. The third and final category of intermediaries includes 
search engines and application service providers, which essentially pro-
vide tools for finding, indexing, filtering, and formatting content.
89
 
Common examples include Google, Bing, and various spam-filtering 
software. 
The first and third types of intermediaries—those that serve as pas-
sive conduits and provide neutral search tools—are generally only pas-
sively monitored by law enforcement.
90
 This is because both types of 
intermediaries typically only serve as passive mediums, which criminals 
misappropriate to unlawful ends, even though the vast majority of activi-
ty is perfectly legal.
91
 Alternatively, the second form of intermediary—
comprised of content hosts—can directly and affirmatively enhance the 
unlawful activities’ effects.92 This is most often true in situations where 
the website is largely devoted to hosting or providing a forum for the 
unlawful conduct in question. For example, a gossip website that encour-
ages posting of frivolous information and rumors on its message boards 
materially contributes to any defamatory postings that result.
93
 Or a ticket 
resale website that facilitates the resale of pre-purchased tickets material-
ly enhances the violation of state anti-scalping laws.
94
 Or even a classi-
fieds website that hosts large quantities of commercial sex advertise-
ments materially facilitates prostitution, human trafficking, and child 
exploitation.
95
  
                                                         
 87. See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933, 
936–37 (2008). 
 88. See generally Ardia, supra note 8. 
 89. Id. at 389. 
 90. See Brenner, supra note 74, at 55–65 (discussing the need for law enforcement to work 
cooperatively with the public to monitor websites for criminal activity). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 82. 
 93. See Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010 
(E.D. Ky. 2012). 
 94. See NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483, at *10 (Mass. Dist. 
Ct. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 95. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2009); M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. 
Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043–46 (E.D. Mo. 2011). 
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Traditionally, brick-and-mortar establishments
96
 incur criminal lia-
bility for knowingly facilitating criminal activity.
97
 For example, know-
ingly hosting or profiting from explicit criminal activity is commonly 
chargeable under an accessory theory attached to the underlying crime.
98
 
Even if a physical establishment could flout criminal liability by avoid-
ing knowledge of the criminal activity, it would nevertheless incur civil 
liability from both public and private actors for negligently contributing 
to the illegal activities.
99
 In this way, criminal and civil liability could 
potentially serve as a disincentive for physical establishments that other-
wise might have facilitated criminal activity. However, as more physical 
establishments move their activities to the Internet, they leave behind 
much of the liability previously assumed under the brick-and-mortar 
model. And with that transition, law enforcement’s ability to enforce 
criminal statutes is steadily eroding. 
B.  Section 230’s Assimilation of Distributor Liability 
From the outset, section 230 “upended a set of principles enshrined 
in common law doctrines that had been developed over decades, if not 
centuries, in cases involving offline intermediaries.” 100  Section 230’s 
enactment abruptly extinguished forms of civil liability for intermediar-
ies that hosted and disseminated tortious content—that much is obvi-
ous.
101
 More insidious, however, is how section 230 obviates various 
models of criminal liability.
102
 Numerous criminal theories of liability 
that traditionally held intermediaries accountable for contributing to un-
lawful activity are increasingly subsumed into the general immunities 
conferred by section 230.
103
 This dynamic is exacerbated with the in-
                                                         
 96. By brick-and-mortar establishments, this Comment refers to the physical equivalent of an 
entity that can now operate entirely online. For example, a traditional newspaper such as the New 
York Times is a brick-and-mortar publisher and is subject to the full battery of legal liability for the 
content they publish and distribute to the public. 
 97. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2011) (describing the criminal liability incurred by per-
sons or entities that facilitate criminal activity). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977) (describing the liability incurred 
by distributors who continue to exhibit unlawful material). 
 100. Ardia, supra note 8, at 411. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See generally Lawrence G. Walters, Shooting the Messenger: An Analysis of Theories of 
Criminal Liability Used Against Adult-Themed Online Service Providers, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
171 (2012). 
 103. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 395–99. 
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creased migration of criminal activity to online intermediaries dedicated 
to hosting unlawful content.
104
 
The most obvious civil liability that section 230 removed—indeed 
the most intended in the CDA’s enactment—is tortious theories of pub-
lisher liability.
105
 In fact, the legislative history of section 230 clearly 
indicates Congress’s intent to immunize ICSPs engaged in good faith 
publishing efforts as well as those who serve merely as passive conduits 
of third-party created content.
106
 However, given early courts’ sweeping 
application of section 230’s open-ended language, the courts also sub-
sumed another form of civil liability into the section’s immunity granting 
provision: distributor liability.
107
 
Distributor liability pertains to entities that host and disseminate 
content to the public. Specifically, an entity that distributes content can 
be held liable if it knows or has reason to know of the content’s tortious 
or illegal nature.
108
 Once a distributor knows or has reason to know that 
the content it is disseminating is unlawful, it must either cease providing 
the material or incur liability.
109
 In the intermediary context, the second 
form of intermediary (those that host and disseminate online content) 
would normally be subject to traditional distributor liability.
110
 This dif-
fers from the first and third category of intermediaries (physical infra-
structure providers and passive conduits), which take no affirmative ac-
tions to distribute content.
111
 
Similar to the subtle distinctions between the three types of online 
intermediaries,
112
 the distinctions for content hosts between publication 
and distribution liability is sometimes ambiguous. Section 230 was clear-
ly intended to remove the disincentive for online intermediaries to en-
gage in any publishing functions with respect to the content they host.
113
 
Thus, an online intermediary can engage in good faith efforts “to restrict 
access to or availability of” offensive material without incurring the 
                                                         
 104. See supra Part III.B. 
 105. This proposition is demonstrated by the very text of section 230(c)(1), which states, “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information provided by another information content provider.” 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996) (emphasis added). 
 106. See supra Part II.A. 
 107. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 402–05. 
 108. See Ardia, supra note 8, at 397–98. 
 109. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977) (describing the liability 
incurred by distributors who continue to exhibit unlawful material). 
 110. See supra Part III.B. 
 111. See supra Part III.B. 
 112. See supra Part III.B. 
 113. See source cited supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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normal liabilities associated with publishing content.
114
 There is no indi-
cation, however, that section 230 was intended to immunize distributive 
activities by online intermediaries.
115
 Distribution differs from publishing 
in that, while publishing is focused on the editorializing of the contents 
substance, distribution is concerned with optimizing the dissemination of 
the content to viewers.
116
 On its face, section 230’s entire focus is on 
immunizing good faith publishing functions.
117
 Nevertheless, courts’ 
overly broad application of section 230(c) consistently ignores the inher-
ent distinction between publishing and distribution and instead applies 
blanket immunity to a broad range of claims.
118
 
Judicial misapplications of section 230 immunity to ICSPs engaged 
in the distribution of tortious content have obviated the entire field of 
distributor liability.
119
 Some commentators view this as an acceptable 
consequence “in facilitating the development of . . . modified exception-
alism encourag[ing] ‘collaborative production’ and the emergence of 
‘non-commodified digital space that facilitates communication.’”120  In 
other words, the “exceptional” benefits the Internet provides justify a 
largely hands-off regulatory approach.
121
 And perhaps that reasoning is 
correct, especially given the effect the CDA has in enabling the prolifera-
tion of communication.
122
 However, the collateral consequence of sub-
suming distributor liability into section 230 immunity is beginning to 
yield unacceptable consequences, particularly with regard to various 
criminal theories of liability that share the same elemental principles of 
culpability as distributive liability. 
C.  Section 230’s Preemption of State’s Traditional Police Powers 
The courts’ extension of section 230’s immunity granting provision 
to distribution theories of civil liability inherently implicates complicity 
                                                         
 114. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(A) (1996). 
 115. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 381–86; David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect 
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 
61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 162 (1997) (“[O]ne could argue from the enumeration of publisher and speaker 
liability in § 230(c)(1) that distributor liability was deliberately omitted.”). 
 116. See Sheridan, supra note 115, at 161–63. 
 117. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 118. Lukmire, supra note 21, at 395. 
 119. See id. at 402–05. 
 120. H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities 
of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 391 (2008) (asserting that section 230 embod-
ies a form of “CyberLibertarian Exceptionalism”). 
 121. Id.; see also Walters, supra note 102, at 212 (claiming that online intermediaries are, “at 
most, passive conduits of information”). 
 122. See Holland, supra note 120, at 386–88. 
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theories of criminal liability. “Complicity” represents a foundational el-
ement of criminal liability that shares the basic theories of culpability as 
distributor liability in the civil context.
123
 Specifically, complicity theo-
ries are supported by the concept that having actual or constructive 
knowledge of illegal conduct confers criminal liability on actions taken 
that enable or further the criminal activity.
 124
 For example, it is a crime 
in many states to knowingly engage in conduct that aids or facilitates 
prostitution,
125
 and normally an enterprise that actively facilitates com-
mercial sex advertising could be subject to criminal liability.
126
 However, 
if such an enterprise moves its activities online, in the form of an inter-
mediary content provider, it flouts normal criminal liability under section 
230. This is because the immunity granting provision contained in sec-
tion 230(c) is wrongly interpreted by courts to preempt state laws that 
seek to hold the ICSPs liable for the elicit content and activity they 
knowingly host. 
Section 230 preempts “any State or local law that” seeks to impose 
liability inconsistent with the immunity section 230 affords.
127
 Courts 
applying this preemptive provision largely accept the Zeran court’s in-
terpretation that section 230 broadly immunizes websites from forms of 
“tort-based lawsuits” and “tort liability.”128 This combination opens the 
doors for an application of section 230 immunity to various forms of 
state and local complicity theories of criminal liability thereby preempt-
ing the entire field of otherwise applicable law. And given the increasing 
amount of traditional crimes being facilitated via online intermediar-
ies,
129
 broad application of section 230 immunity is progressively ob-
structing historic police powers. 
States are frustrated. Tired of capitulating the invulnerability of cer-
tain forms of criminal activity that had migrated to the Internet, some 
states have attempted to expand criminal liability to online intermediaries 
facilitating criminal activity on the Internet. For example, in Washington 
State, legislators passed a bill that criminalized the act of hosting com-
                                                         
 123. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2011), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
577(2) (1977). 
 124. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1004 (2012). 
 125. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.060 (2011). 
 126. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2011). 
 127. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (1996). 
 128. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Lukmire, supra 
note 21, at 395. 
 129. See supra Part III.A. 
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mercial sex advertisements involving a minor.
130
 The provisions of the 
bill essentially imposed strict liability on ICSPs that hosted commercial 
sex advertisements depicting minors, which could only be overcome by a 
showing of “bona fide” efforts to ascertain the age of the individual de-
picted.
131
 Another state followed suit by introducing similar legislation 
designed to expressly criminalize websites that actively advertised com-
mercial sex.
132
 The Washington law was quickly challenged by ICSPs 
claiming it was preempted by section 230
133
 and that it violated the First 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
134
 A federal district court agreed 
and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the law’s enforcement in 
July 2012.
135
 According to the court decision, Washington’s unsuccessful 
attempt to impose criminal liability on websites advertising minors for 
commercial sex was clearly incongruent with section 230.
136
 However, 
the bill does represent a growing frustration—if not desperation—by 
                                                         
 130. Senate Bill 6251 was scheduled to take effect on June 7, 2012, and essentially extended 
criminal liability to websites which hosted commercial sexual advertisements depicting a minor. The 
relevant provisions of the bill are as follows: 
(1) A person commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor if he 
or she knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays, or causes directly or indirectly, to 
be published, disseminated or displayed, and advertisement for a commercial sex act, 
which is to take place in the state of Washington and that includes the depiction of a mi-
nor . . . . 
(2) In a prosecution under this statute, it is not a defense that the defendant did not know 
the age of the minor depicted in the advertisement. It is a defense, which the defendant 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made a reasonable bo-
na fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor depicted in the advertisement by re-
quiring, prior to publication, dissemination, or display of the advertisement, production of 
a driver’s license, marriage license, birth certificate, or other governmental or educational 
identification card or paper of the minor depicted in the advertisement. 
S.B. 6251, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Specifically, the Tennessee legislature passed a similar law to the Washington bill. See 
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-315 (2012). However, the Tennessee law was soon challenged in federal 
court and subsequently enjoined from enforcement. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction, Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, No. 3:12-cv-00654, 2013 WL 1249063, at *2 
(M.D. Tenn. 2013). 
 133. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction, Backpage.com, LLC v. 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  
 134. Id. at 1275–86. In many respects, the bill was just like the older provisions of the CDA 
that were struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU. 
 135. Id. at 1265. 
 136. As the court in Backpage.com stated, 
SB 6251 is inconsistent with Section 230 because it criminalizes the ‘knowing’ publica-
tion, dissemination, or display of specified content. In doing so, it creates an incentive for 
online service providers not to monitor the content that passes through its channels. This 
was precisely the situation that the CDA was enacted to remedy. 
Id. at 1273 (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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state and local governments to combat the increasing amount of criminal 
activity finding safe refuge on the Internet. 
As more and more criminal activity migrates to the Internet and 
with the apparent difficulty for states to criminalize complicity by inter-
mediaries, section 230’s preemptive effect on traditional state laws is 
mounting. These civil and criminal laws stand at the heart of state’s his-
toric police powers. Surely this was not Congress’s intent when it enact-
ed section 230. Nonetheless, if this trend continues, the states’ ability to 
combat criminal activity will continue to erode, and with it, a fundamen-
tal component of their sovereignty. 
IV.  RENEWING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION 
Modern courts applying section 230 immunity frequently accept the 
broad preemptive effect given to the statute by earlier courts. Missing 
from virtually every court’s analysis is a presumption against section 
230’s preemption of traditional state police powers in non-publisher con-
texts. Were courts to reexamine Congress’s preemptive intent, it would 
quickly become apparent that section 230 was only intended to override 
publisher theories of liability. As illustrated below, this is evident from 
both the text of section 230 as well as the legislative history and purpose. 
While Congress generally has broad authority to regulate the Inter-
net, it does not necessarily follow that courts should give section 230 the 
broadest possible effect. The Internet simultaneously embodies a chan-
nel,
137
 article,
138
 instrumentality,
139
 and activity substantially affecting 
interstate commerce.
140
 Accordingly, Congress generally has broad au-
thority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the Internet, and any such 
regulation will preempt “state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, 
federal law.”141 But the mere ability of Congress to regulate the Internet 
does not necessarily preempt concurring state regulation.
142
 Even if Con-
gress acts, courts should maintain a presumption against preemption ab-
                                                         
 137. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 357 (1964). 
 138. See, e.g., E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
 140. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
 141. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 142. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (arguing that the states retain “flexibility to regulate Internet” despite 
its obvious categorization as interstate commerce). Professors Goldsmith and Sykes argue against 
the categorical presumptions by earlier commentators that any local regulation of the Internet repre-
sented a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law 
and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Dan L. Burk, Feder-
alism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1123–34 (1996). 
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sent a showing of Congress’s “clear and manifest” intent to invalidate 
local regulation.
143
 A court’s “ultimate task” in determining whether a 
federal law preempts a local regulation is to decide whether the local law 
is consistent with the “structure and purpose” of the federal statute.144 In 
application, a court’s conflict inquiry is “guided by two cornerstones 
of . . . pre-emption jurisprudence.”145 First, “the purpose of Congress is 
the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”146  Second, courts 
assume “that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be su-
perseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress.”147 
In determining the first cornerstone—Congress’s preemptive in-
tent—courts will look for either an express preemption provision within 
the statute or a clear conflict in which state law frustrates the federal 
statutory purposes or objectives.
148
 Turning back to section 230, Con-
gress expressly articulated the preemptive scope of the statue as it per-
tains to state law: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent 
any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed un-
der any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”149 Unfor-
tunately, this language is entirely self-referencing and essentially directs 
courts to engage in the second cornerstone analysis identified above: 
identifying impliedly preempted statutes.
150
 
A plain language reading of section 230 and its legislative history 
implies that Congress only intended to preempt State laws that imposed 
publisher liability. Identifying the purpose of Congress necessitates a 
broader inquiry into Congress’s general intent by enacting the statute.151  
 
                                                         
 143. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 144. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); see also Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824) (“[T]hough enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, 
[laws that] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . must yield to [federal law].”). 
 145. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
 146. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
 147. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Intrinsically, the presumption against preemption of state’s traditional police powers resonates of 
this country’s thematic notion of federalism and inherent state sovereignty and, therefore, should be 
maintained in every instance. See Robert S. Peck, A Separation-of-Powers Defense of the “Presump-
tion Against Preemption,” 84 TUL L. REV. 1185, 1196 (2010). 
 148. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–68 (1941); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary 
Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 
253, 270–72 (2011). 
 149. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (1996). 
 150. See Young, supra note 148, at 273–76. 
 151. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 556 (2009). 
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Thankfully, this inquiry is short, since Congress expressly articulated the 
policies underlying section 230: 
(b) Policy 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that present-
ly exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize 
user control over what information is received by individuals, 
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive 
computer services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to re-
strict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate 
material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to de-
ter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassing 
by means of computer.
152
 
Essentially, Congress’s purposes for enacting section 230 can be loosely 
categorized into three separate policy goals. First, Congress wanted to 
keep the Internet largely deregulated and allow the current online econ-
omy to continue to grow unhindered.
153
 Next, Congress intended to over-
turn the Stratton Oakmont ruling and remove the disincentive for web-
sites to exercise any efforts at removing offensive content from their 
site.
154
 Finally, Congress intended to ensure decency on the Internet.
155
 
Considering the three distinct policy aims of Congress, section 230 
does not preempt the entire field of online regulation leaving nothing for 
states.
156
 Specifically, Congress’s purpose was to preempt state and local 
laws that imposed civil liability for websites that took voluntary efforts 
to remove offensive material provided by third parties—by focusing on 
                                                         
 152. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(5) (1996). 
 153. See supra Part II.A–B. (discussing the Cox–Wyden proposal’s aim in the overall statutory 
framework of Senator Exon’s CDA). 
 154. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 155. See generally Cannon, supra note 15. 
 156. Any state is free to enforce state laws so long as such laws are “consistent with this sec-
tion.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (1996). 
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publisher liability.
157
 This purpose was “clear and manifest” given the 
express policy aims contained in section 230(b), the explicit strictures of 
immunity formulated in 230(c), and the circumstantial context of Con-
gress’s response. 158 
Initially, courts only struck down the laws that Congress intended 
to preempt. Because the early courts applying section 230 were largely 
dealing with factual circumstances similar to those originally envisioned 
by section 230’s drafters, their preemption analysis of conflicting state 
and local laws was fairly straightforward.
 159
 As preemption analysis of 
traditional publisher liability laws was the express aim of section 230,
160
 
courts generally accepted the preemptive effect when analyzing incon-
sistent state laws.
161
 
Unfortunately, as the Internet continued to grow, section 230 was 
invoked in more and more circumstances outside of those initially envi-
sioned by the drafters. For example, the district court in Roommates er-
roneously applied section 230’s publisher immunity to the defendant 
ICSP for conduct that amounted to content creation and dissemination.
162
 
And in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court 
ruling that the CDA precluded a promissory estoppel claim after the de-
fendant-website promised to remove a fake profile of the plaintiff but 
then failed to do so.
163
 Specifically, the Barnes court determined that the 
district court was correct in applying section 230 immunity to the plain-
tiff’s claims that the website had a duty to remove the offensive content; 
however, the CDA did not cover promissory estoppel arising from the 
website’s voluntary commitment to remove the posting.164 
The cases outlined above demonstrate how courts often accept the 
broad preemptive effect that early courts assigned to section 230(c) and 
infrequently examine the individual claims involved. That is, courts sel-
                                                         
 157. Id.; see Sheridan, supra note 115, at 151–52. 
 158. Congress was specifically responding to the Stratton Oakmont ruling in an effort to avoid 
similar circumstances in the future. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 159. Specifically, early courts applied section 230 immunity in instances where a website was 
being sued by a private individual seeking to impose a form of publisher liability on the website for 
hosting or providing a means of distribution of defamatory or otherwise offensive content. See, e.g., 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997); Carafano v. Metrosplash, Inc., 339 
F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 
(10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 160. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996). 
 161. See supra note 48 and accompanying cases. 
 162. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 163. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 164. Id. 
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dom engage in a refreshed inquiry into whether or not the facts and cir-
cumstances of a case are consistent with the limited scope and preemp-
tive context in which Congress intended section 230 to operate. Instead, 
courts accept broad articulations of section 230’s preemptive effect with 
little thought to the impact of the changing circumstances on the Internet. 
What is actually warranted in cases alleging non-publisher theories of 
liability is a renewed inquiry into Congress’s preemptive intent, replete 
with a presumption against preemption. 
Also missing from current courts’ application of section 230 is the 
presumption against preemption of traditional state police powers. The 
obvious effect is that increasingly more criminal activity finds a safe ha-
ven on websites dedicated to facilitating unlawful activity. This is largely 
avoidable because a renewed inquiry into the preemptive effect of sec-
tion 230 would reveal that Congress did not intend to immunize websites 
engaged in blatantly criminal activity. Criminal activity does not serve 
any of the three general policy goals stated in the statute: Specifically, an 
ICSP that hosts a significant amount of cybercrime does not help drive 
the growth of the online economy (at least not the legal online economy). 
Those ICSPs do not engage in good faith efforts to remove objectionable 
content from the Internet,
165
 but are instead in the business of hosting and 
disseminating objectionable content. And they most certainly do not 
comport with the overarching statutory framework of the CDA.
166
 As 
such, courts should stop presuming preemption in all section 230 cases, 
and instead examine the text of section 230 and Congress’s intent to 
preempt state laws. 
V.  SOLUTIONS 
Even if courts engage in a renewed analysis of section 230’s 
preemptive effect and conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt a 
given state law, they will still be faced with determining to what extent a 
                                                         
 165. For example, certain websites engage in filtering or blocking of limited offensive or un-
lawful content only in an effort to avoid criminal liability for themselves and their unlawful users. 
This is clearly not out of a good samaritan desire, but is instead motivated purely out of a desire to 
maintain the profitability of their site. Not only is this blatantly outside of the policy aims of section 
230, but it is also explicitly outside of the immunity-granting provision which state “efforts taken in 
good faith” are immune from civil liability. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (1996). Notice also that the very 
title of this subsection is “Civil Liability,” further evidencing the conclusion that Congress was not 
expecting the provision to serve as a shield for criminal activity of any kind. Curiously, courts have 
not paid much attention to this clear contradiction despite the unequivocal requirement in the very 
title of the immunity-granting provision—“Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening 
of offensive material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996). For a discussion of potential judicial remedies for 
this misconstruction, see infra Part V.A. 
 166. See supra Part II.A. 
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defendant website should be held liable. This is necessitated by the fact 
that most websites perform entirely innocuous distribution functions and 
are only misappropriated by third party users bent on unlawful activity. 
Thus, courts need to craft a doctrine for determining when websites are 
merely hijacked by unlawful third-party users as opposed to when web-
sites are themselves complicit in illegal activity. Inherently, any judicial 
remedy will suffer from inconsistency, and given the dynamic and evolv-
ing nature of the Internet, new legislation will eventually be imperative. 
A.  A Judicial Band-Aid 
As section 230’s immunity granting provisions continue to en-
croach into the traditional zone of state police power, courts will be faced 
with a choice of either applying broad immunity, contradicting Con-
gress’s intended scope, or fashioning creative construction of section 230 
to avoid this conflict. However, because courts can and should construe 
federal statutes and regulatory schemes to preserve historic state police 
powers,
167
 it is only a matter of time until the current broad immunity-
granting interpretations fall away, leaving a much more restricted con-
struction.
168
 As previously mentioned, several courts have already begun 
to construe section 230 in a narrower manner, abandoning the expansive 
reading originally given to the statute in Zeran.169 
Beginning with Roommates,170 an expansive reading of “develop in 
part” would remove ICSPs that assume distributor-like roles to facilitate 
criminal activity from section 230(c)’s grant of immunity.171 However, 
this reading of section 230 is not problem-free. In essence, the expansive 
reading of the word develop, as articulated in Roomates, would serve to 
remove nearly all forms of distributor liability from section 230 immuni-
                                                         
 167. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 168. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590–604 (2001) (Stevens J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted). 
As the regulations at issue in this suit implicate [powers] that lie at the heart of the States’ 
traditional police power . . . our precedents require that the Court construe the preemption 
provision ‘narrow[ly].’ If Congress’[s] intent to pre-empt a particular category of regula-
tion is ambiguous, such regulations are not pre-empted. . . . [T]he scope of a pre-emption 
provision must give effect to a ‘reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress in-
tended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, 
and the law.’ 
Id. at 591–92 (citation omitted).  
 169. See supra Part II.B. 
 170. See supra Part II.B; see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168–70 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 171. See Weslander, supra note 62, at 293–96; see also Doty, supra note 65, at 129–32 (dis-
cussing how the Roommates court extrapolated the “underlying illegality” test from it’s construction 
of the term “development” contained in section 230). 
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ty. While this would be more in accord with the original aims of section 
230 set out by Congress,
172
 it certainly would not be a practical solution 
given the enormous burden it would place on legitimate websites and the 
dampening effect it would have on free speech.
173
 Instead, a more nu-
anced approach is appropriate—one that would not subject to liability the 
majority of legitimate online intermediaries that are merely misappropri-
ated by third parties to unlawful ends. 
The court in Roommates articulated an “underlying illegality” test 
to operate in tandem with its expansive interpretation of section 230’s 
development language.
174
 This component preserves the broad grant of 
immunity for the vast majority of websites, while exposing to liability 
only those websites that somehow “contribute[] materially to the alleged 
illegality of the conduct.”175 The problem with this test is in its applica-
tion. Some courts have adopted a more discernable “solicitation standard,” 
which only voids section 230 immunity if websites explicitly invite un-
lawful content or activity from third parties.
176
 However, this approach 
allows websites to flout both civil and criminal liability by avoiding ex-
press solicitations, and instead, resorting to more subtle and tacit invita-
tions. At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have employed an 
“inducement” standard whereby a website is excluded from immunity 
when it engages in conduct that encourages third parties to behave un-
lawfully.
177
 The inducement standard is preferable to the solicitation 
standard in its ability to exclude immunity from websites that maintain a 
mere rouse of legitimacy. However, it could become subject to over-
application absent an objective inquiry into the knowledge and intent of 
the ICSP. 
The most comprehensive judicial solution to properly limiting sec-
tion 230’s immunity centers around an objective bad faith exception.178 
This exception would essentially begin with the inducement analysis out-
lined above, but it would only void immunity upon a showing that the 
defendant-website was acting in bad faith. In most instances, this would 
have to be objectively inferred from the website’s conduct. For example, 
                                                         
 172. Specifically, it would remove many forms of distributor liability from the grant of immun-
ity and restore the focus of the provision on publisher functions. 
 173. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 404–05 and authorities cited therein. 
 174. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68; Doty, supra note 65, at 129–32. 
 175. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68. 
 176. See Doty, supra note 65, at 132–37 and cases cited therein. 
 177. Id. at 136–42. 
 178. Lukmire, supra note 21, 407–11 (“An implied bad faith exception to section 230 immuni-
ty for distributors of defamatory content would allow more plaintiffs with meritorious claims to 
prevail, and would be easier to implement and administer.”). 
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bad faith can be inferred from affirmative actions to enhance the con-
tent’s unlawfulness, such as creating financial incentives; reducing the 
risk of detection by law-enforcement; creating webpages devoted to ille-
gal content; and providing tools specifically designed for the illegal con-
tent. Implied incentives, such as deriving substantial financial gain from 
the unlawful content, would also evidence bad faith on the part of web-
site. 
The proposed bad faith exception would seriously limit the applica-
tion of section 230 immunity to websites engaged in unlawful activity 
and allow states to employ more proactive measures targeting these in-
termediaries. However, short of a Supreme Court decision that compre-
hensively articulates this standard, any judicial remedy will inherently 
suffer from inconsistency in application and jurisdiction among states. 
Eventually, it will become necessary for Congress to amend or replace 
section 230 with a more agile statutory scheme aimed at preserving free-
dom of information on the Internet while still allowing states to combat 
criminal activity. 
B.  The Eventual Legislative Imperative 
The most obvious solution to avoiding unconstitutional encroach-
ments into state police powers is to enact legislation either amending sec-
tion 230 or replacing it with a more sophisticated statutory scheme. Giv-
en that the majority of commentary on section 230 is from a defamatory 
view,
179
 the most common solutions have drawn from other statutory 
schemes currently in place. Specifically, several commentators have pro-
posed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a viable starting 
point for modeling a new section 230.
180
 Essentially, a DMCA-modeled 
statute would impose liability on a website for knowingly hosting unlaw-
ful content, deriving a benefit attributable to the offending content, and 
refusing to remove the unlawful content after receiving notice of its ille-
gality.
181
 While a DMCA-modeled statute does appear applicable in a 
defamation context, its requirements of notice and case-by-case removal 
of individual content make it an impractical solution for allowing law-
enforcement agencies to police and shut down websites devoted to host-
ing illegal activity. At the same time, a statute that imposes traditional 
“facilitation” liability would unnecessarily exempt from immunity web-
                                                         
 179. See supra Part III.B. 
 180. See Colby Ferris, Communication Indecency: Why the Communications Decency Act, and 
the Judicial Interpretation of It, Has Led to a Lawless Internet in the Area of Defamation, 14 BARRY 
L. REV. 123, 135 (2010); see also Lukmire, supra note 21, at 406. 
 181. See Ferris, supra note 180, at 135. 
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sites that are occasionally misused for illegal purposes. What is needed is 
a statute that strikes a balance between the two approaches. 
One alternative would be a statute that essentially codifies the ob-
jective bad faith principles.
182
 However, the text of the statute would 
have to walk the line between exempting websites that take affirmative 
steps to disseminate unlawful content and those that serve merely as pas-
sive conduits of information. Basically, this would amount to a showing 
of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff or State, thus maintaining the pre-
sumption of immunity. However, upon a showing that the defendant 
website has taken affirmative actions or otherwise designed its services 
to invite, encourage, or facilitate unlawful content and activity, the web-
site will no longer be immune from civil or criminal liability. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Section 230 of the CDA was enacted to remove the disincentive for 
online intermediaries to take good faith efforts to monitor and remove 
offensive content from their websites. Specifically, Congress meant to 
remove traditional forms of publisher liability and the accompanying 
legal exposure in the context of defamatory and pornographic content 
posted by third parties. Thus, Congress intended to preempt any state or 
local laws that imposed such theories of liability. Unfortunately, early 
courts interpreting section 230 over-read the scope of immunity provided 
by the provision and erroneously broadened the range of civil and crimi-
nal liability schemes subject to preemption. The negative consequences 
of this misreading are increasingly felt as more and more criminal activi-
ty migrates to the Internet, and the online intermediaries that knowingly 
host such activity are held immune from traditional modes of checking 
such lawlessness. 
Turning the tide against a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet 
starts with a reexamination of Congress’s intended scope of immunity 
and the implicit preemptive effect of section 230. Beginning with the 
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt an entire field of 
traditional state police power, and after closely examining the textual 
components of section 230 as well as the legislative history, it soon be-
comes apparent that immunity is only applicable in a specific set of cir-
cumstances. In applying this analysis, courts could incorporate some 
form of objective bad faith determination to distinguish between web-
sites that are furthering the purposes of section 230, as opposed to those 
that are merely posing as good Samaritans. Alternatively, Congress could 
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clarify the scope of immunity provided to online intermediaries by 
amending section 230 or enacting a new regulatory scheme all together. 
 
